

Who's Keeping the Peace?

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Regionalization and Contemporary Peace Operations

Pace operations involve the dispatch of expeditionary forces, with or without a United Nations (UN) mandate, to implement an agreement between warring states or factions, which may (or may not) include enforcing that agreement in the face of willful defiance. Although the UN has the most experience in authorizing and conducting such operations, the organization has never possessed a monopoly on them. This situation has become more obvious in recent years as a variety of non-UN actors have conducted peace operations, often without the Security Council's authorization. In Africa, for instance, since 1990 regional organizations have conducted ten peace operations: five by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), two under the mantle of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), one by the Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States (CEMAC), and two by the African Union (AU).¹ Africans have also witnessed British operations in Sierra Leone; French operations in Central African Republic and Côte d'Ivoire; a South African detachment deployed to Burundi; and a French-led force dispatched to the Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In Europe, Italy led a peace operation in Albania in 1997; Russian troops—often under the umbrella of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)—have deployed to Moldova, Georgia, and Tajikistan; and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) continues to lead a large peace operation in Kosovo and in December 2004 handed control of its Bosnia operation over to the European Union (EU). In addition, in 2003 NATO took command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. In the same year, following NATO's departure, the EU conducted Operation Concordia in Macedonia and followed it

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1. These operations took place in Liberia (twice), Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Côte d'Ivoire, Lesotho, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Burundi, and Sudan respectively.

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on with a police mission, Proxima. In the Americas, the United States led a multinational force into Haiti after the departure of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in the spring of 2004. Finally, in Asia, Australia has led two peace operations: one to East Timor in 1999 and the other to the Solomon Islands since 2003.

These developments have reinvigorated older debates about which actors and institutions can authorize and conduct peace operations most effectively. Thus far, much of the literature discussing these issues has been framed in terms of the debate about “regionalization,” that is, how to devise the most appropriate relationship between the UN and regional arrangements in matters related to international peace and security. The label “regionalization,” however, does not accurately reflect recent trends in peace operations. As we demonstrate, not only have regional arrangements sometimes gone out-of-area, but non-UN peace operations have also been conducted by individual states and coalitions of the willing. This raises the thorny issue of how to evaluate these different types of non-UN peace operations and their impact on what the UN charter refers to as “international peace and security.”² We argue that this can be done by assessing these operations in terms of their legitimacy, their effectiveness in achieving their mandate, and their ability to contribute to stable peace and security in the respective region. In developing these criteria, we refine several earlier attempts to evaluate peace operations in a way that takes account of the different types of actors authorizing and conducting them.³ We contend that the non-UN peace operations assessed here have not fundamentally challenged international society’s norm of nonintervention without host-state consent. There is, however, a danger that the persistent recourse to non-UN operations may reduce the likelihood that poorer parts of the world will enjoy the benefits of high-quality peace operations as envisioned by the so-called Brahimi report.⁴

2. It is not our intention in this article to explain the rise in non-UN peace operations.

3. Earlier attempts to evaluate peace operations include William J. Durch, “Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons of the 1990s,” in Durch, ed., *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s* (Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 17–22; Steven Ratner, *The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict after the Cold War* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1995); A.B. Featherston, *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1994); R.C. Johansen, “UN Peacekeeping: How Should We Measure Success?” *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (October 1994), pp. 307–310; and Daniel Druckman and Paul Stern, “Perspectives on Evaluating Peacekeeping Missions,” *International Journal of Peace Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1999), pp. 1–14.

4. “The Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations” (A/55/305 S/2000/809) is commonly referred to as the Brahimi report after its chairman, former Algerian Foreign Minister Lakhdar

To explore these claims, the article proceeds in four parts. In the opening section we discuss the debates generated by non-UN peace operations during the Cold War and in more recent years, and briefly highlight the limitations imposed by thinking of these developments in terms of regionalization. The second section develops a typology of non-UN peace operations according to the different actors conducting and authorizing them, namely, individual states, coalitions of the willing, and regional arrangements. The third section develops criteria to evaluate these operations in terms of their legitimacy, success in accomplishing the mandate, and contribution to stable peace and security. We then use these criteria to assess a contemporary example of each type of non-UN peace operation, namely, British operations in Sierra Leone, the Australian-led coalition in the Solomon Islands, and the African Union's mission in Burundi.

The Proliferation of Non-UN Peace Operations

Although scholars and practitioners have recognized the proliferation of actors conducting peace operations, most analyses have focused on the problems and prospects of regional arrangements acting as peacekeepers and peace enforcers.⁵ On the one hand, there are those who believe that regional solutions could bridge the gap between means and ends that plagued peace operations in the early 1990s and offer an alternative to the "corrupt," "wasteful," "politicized," and "overly bureaucratized" practices of the UN.⁶ On the other hand, there are those, including many former and current senior UN figures, who in-

Brahimi. The report was published in August 2000 in response to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's request that the panel thoroughly review the UN's "peace and security activities" and "present a clear set of specific, concrete and practical recommendations to assist the United Nations in conducting such activities better in the future." See Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, "What Future for Peace Operations? Brahimi and Beyond," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Spring 2004), pp. 183–212.

5. See, for example, Hilaire McCoubrey and Justin Morris, *Regional Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000); Renata Dawn, *International Policing in Peace Operations: The Role of Regional Organizations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Paul Diehl and Joseph Leppgold, eds., *Regional Conflict Management* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003); Connie Peck, *Sustainable Peace: The Role of the UN and Regional Organizations* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997); Jane Boulden, ed., *Dealing with Conflict in Africa: The United Nations and Regional Organizations* (New York: Palgrave, 2003); Michael Pugh and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, eds., *The United Nations and Regional Security* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2003); and Paul Diehl, "Forks in the Road: Theoretical and Policy Concerns for 21st Century Peacekeeping," *Global Society*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (July 2000), pp. 337–360.

6. This latter position is presented throughout Frederick H. Fleitz Jr., *Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s: Causes, Solutions, and U.S. Interests* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002).

sist that regional arrangements do not offer a panacea. Former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, for example, condemned regionalization as a “dangerous” idea that threatened to weaken the internationalist basis of the UN.⁷ Former UN Undersecretary-General Brian Urquhart insisted that all peace operations confront similar challenges and that non-UN actors could make only a limited contribution.⁸ A former head of the UN’s Department of Political Affairs, Marrack Goulding, also cautioned that most regional arrangements lacked the experience, bureaucratic structures, and resources necessary to conduct peace operations effectively.⁹ Similarly, the current head of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, has warned that regionalization has encouraged an “only in my backyard” approach that spells trouble for regions that lack the necessary capacities.¹⁰ Finally, it has been pointed out that no other organization retains the universal legitimacy of the UN.¹¹

We accept that for a variety of reasons the regional level of analysis is crucial for understanding contemporary international security issues. Nevertheless, suggesting that contemporary trends in peace operations are synonymous with regionalization obscures some potentially important developments.¹² First, as we demonstrate later, the range of actors is not limited to regional arrangements—individual states and ad hoc coalitions of the willing have also conducted and authorized operations. Advocates of coalitions of the willing, including U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and John Howard’s government in Australia, insist that regional organizations are encumbered with many of the same problems confronting the UN.¹³ Second, regional organizations and military alliances have engaged in crisis management beyond their

7. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished: A U.S.-U.N. Saga* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999), p. 306.

8. Sir Brian Urquhart, email exchange with students from Marin Academy High School, UC Berkeley’s Model UN Program, at Boalt Law School, March 1999, <http://globetrotter.Berkeley.edu/UN/Urquhart/urqchat99.peace.html>.

9. Marrack Goulding, *Peacemonger* (London: John Murray, 2002), p. 217.

10. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, “Everybody’s Doing It,” *World Today*, Vol. 59, Nos. 8/9 (August/September 2003), pp. 35–36.

11. Luiz Carlos de Costa, principal officer of the undersecretary general for peacekeeping operations, “Supporting Peace in New Kinds of Conflict,” address delivered at the Seminar on Crisis Management and Information Technology, Helsinki, Finland, September 30, 2002, p. 4.

12. Both Luiz Carlos de Costa (*ibid.*, p. 4) and Jean-Marie Guéhenno (“Everybody’s Doing It”) recently used this label.

13. According to Australia’s foreign minister, Alexander Downer, multilateralism is a “synonym for an ineffective and unfocused policy involving internationalism of the lowest common denominator,” and multilateral organizations are “behemoths.” Quoted in Michelle Gratton, “The World According to Howard,” *Age* (Melbourne), July 2, 2003.

own borders, as NATO's involvement in the Balkans and Afghanistan, and the EU's operations in Macedonia, Bosnia, and the DRC, demonstrate.

The UN charter created a system flexible enough not to grant the Security Council a monopoly of authority on issues of international peace and security.¹⁴ As Slovenia's ambassador to the Security Council argued at the time of NATO's intervention in Kosovo, the council has a primary but not exclusive responsibility for peace and security; and in cases where the council fails to act in response to a threat to the peace, other agents can legitimately choose to do so.¹⁵ Although the UN charter permits its members to use force only in self-defense or with the council's authorization, it does not prohibit "intervention by invitation."¹⁶ Nor does the charter resolve the fundamental moral dilemmas raised by the issue of humanitarian intervention. As Secretary-General Kofi Annan asked with respect to the 1994 Rwandan genocide, if "in those dark days and hours leading up to the genocide, a coalition of states had been prepared to act in defense of the Tutsi population, but did not receive prompt Council authorization, should such a coalition have stood aside and allowed the horror to unfold?"¹⁷

It is therefore not surprising that the question of where authority resides in relation to peace operations has frequently proved controversial.¹⁸ For example, the issue arose over Palestine in 1948 (in relation to the Arab League), Hungary in 1956 (in relation to the Warsaw Pact), and the Dominican Republic in 1965 (in relation to the Organization of American States, OAS). These cases raised two main questions. First, was it legitimate for non-UN actors to uphold the UN's principles and purposes without the organization's prior authorization? Second, when the crisis in question lay within a regional arrangement's

14. See Adam Roberts, "Law and the Use of Force after Iraq," *Survival*, Vol. 45, No. 2 (June 2003), pp. 31–56; and Roberts's subsequent exchange about his article with Catherine Guicherd of the French Ministry of Defense, "Letters to the Editor," *Survival*, Vol. 45, No. 4 (December 2003), pp. 229–231. We agree with Roberts's conclusion "that the Council, while its role is always important, does not have a monopoly on international security issues." "Letters to the Editor," p. 230. 15. S/PV.3988, March 24, 1999, pp. 6–7.

16. The government of a state is legally entitled to request assistance from other states in the suppression of rebel groups. See Michael Byers, "Terrorism, the Use of Force, and International Law after 11 September," *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, Vol. 51, No. 2 (April 2002), pp. 403–404.

17. "Secretary-General's Annual Report to the General Assembly," September 20, 1999, cited by Nicholas J. Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 294.

18. See Norman J. Padelford, "Regional Organization and the United Nations," *International Organization*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (May 1954), pp. 203–216; and Francis O. Wilcox, "Regionalism and the United Nations," *International Organization*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (July 1965), pp. 789–811.

borders, did the UN or the regional organization have the principal authority to act? The Palestine case provides an example of the first question. In 1948 the League of Arab States claimed that it was acting to uphold the principles and purposes of the UN charter when its forces entered Palestine in response to Israel's declaration of independence. This plea was rejected by the United States and not discussed further within the Security Council.¹⁹ A cease-fire agreement was arranged the following year, and one of the UN's first peace operations, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, deployed to monitor it.²⁰ The Hungarian case illustrates the second question. In 1956 the Soviet Union justified its intervention in Hungary to suppress a pro-democracy movement not by insisting that it was upholding the principles and purposes of the UN but by arguing that within the Warsaw Pact zone, the pact took precedence over the UN charter.²¹ Once again, though, the Security Council did not discuss the question at length.

The OAS operation in the Dominican Republic in 1965 is more instructive precisely because the Security Council discussed it at some length. As violence spread through the republic following a coup, U.S. Marines were deployed, ostensibly to protect U.S. citizens. Following criticism from both OAS members and wider international society, the United States pushed for the mission to be brought under OAS auspices. It succeeded despite the deep misgivings of some of the organization's members, notably Brazil. In the Security Council, the Soviet Union, France, and the Asian and African representatives were highly critical of the United States, insisting that only the Security Council had the authority to mandate military actions. The United States argued that chapter 8 of the charter gave the OAS a legitimate role to play, but it failed to persuade the council of its case. Nevertheless, the United States continued to argue that it was legitimate for regional organizations to take action within their sphere of influence without UN authorization.²²

19. UN Security Council meetings 295, S.PV/295, May 18, 1948, and 330, S.PV/330, July 7, 1948. The Security Council issued a resolution (resolution 49, May 22, 1948) presented by the United Kingdom calling for all parties to "abstain from any hostile military action." It was passed with eight affirmative votes and three abstentions (the Soviet Union, Syria, and Ukraine). The resolution demonstrates that while the council rejected the Arab League's claims, it nevertheless lacked the consensus necessary to issue a stronger condemnation or to take enforcement measures.

20. Nathan A. Pelcovits, *The Long Armistice: UN Peacekeeping and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-1960* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993), pp. 9-17.

21. See the *United Nations Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary*, eleventh sess., Supplement No. 18, A/3992, 1957.

22. Asbjørn Eide, "Peace-keeping and Enforcement by Regional Organizations: Its Place in the United Nations System," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1966), p. 129.

Similar debates reappeared in earnest in 1999 with NATO's intervention in Kosovo. Although ECOWAS (three times), SADC (twice), and NATO (once) had acted earlier in the decade, the relationship between regional arrangements and the UN had received relatively little attention. NATO's 1995 Operation Deliberate Force and subsequent International Force and Stabilization Force missions were authorized by the UN and thus did not generate much controversy with regard to legitimacy. Similarly, despite significant rifts within ECOWAS, the Security Council retroactively endorsed its operations in Liberia in 1990, Sierra Leone in 1997, and Guinea-Bissau in 1999.

SADC's operations, however, were more problematic. In 1998 two different groups of states claimed to be operating under SADC's authority when they conducted operations in Lesotho (South Africa and Botswana) and in the DRC (Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe). Both cases were examples of "intervention by invitation" involving enforcement activities. Whereas the Security Council did not publicly discuss the South African-led Operation Boleas in Lesotho, it did comment on the operations in the DRC but neither explicitly endorsed nor explicitly condemned them. Initially, the council emphasized "the need for all States to refrain from any interference in each other's internal affairs."²³ Later, however, it distinguished between invited and uninvited (primarily Rwandan and Ugandan) forces within the DRC.²⁴ When Zimbabwe argued that its intervention was in accordance with UN principles and purposes to uphold the territorial integrity of a member state and to prevent its government from being toppled by invading forces, the council did not explicitly reject its line of reasoning.²⁵ In contrast, the Security Council explicitly rejected the argument put forward by Rwanda and Uganda that their military intervention in the DRC was justified in terms of national self-defense.²⁶

During much of the 1990s, therefore, peace operations conducted (and sometimes authorized) by regional organizations tended to be either uncontroversial in terms of their legitimacy and their wider impact on the international rules governing the use of force, or they were ignored by the Security Council. By the end of the decade, however, these dilemmas reemerged in earnest. On the one hand, NATO's apparent success in the Balkans encouraged Western leaders to openly advocate regionalization. For example, President Bill

23. S/PV.3922, August 31, 1998, p. 2.

24. See Security Council resolution 1234, April 9, 1999.

25. See S/PV.3987, March 19, 1999.

26. See Security Council resolution 1304, June 16, 2000.

Clinton's presidential decision directive 71, released on February 24, 2000, identified the strengthening of the capacity of regional organizations as a major objective. On the other hand, since 1999 a variety of actors have undertaken peace operations without UN authorization, including NATO in Kosovo and Australia in the Solomon Islands.²⁷ Both NATO and Australia contended that they could conduct more effective operations than the UN and that they had the political authority to mandate such actions. In NATO's case, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright repeatedly argued that the alliance did not need UN Security Council authorization because the North Atlantic Council, which at that time comprised fifteen liberal democracies, was a more legitimate voice on the use of force than the Security Council, which included many non-democracies. According to Secretary of State Albright, repressive regimes should not be given the opportunity to veto humanitarian action by a coalition of liberal democracies.²⁸

To what extent have these challenges encouraged non-UN peace operations? Table 1 shows UN peace operations under way in February 2005. It highlights two important points. First, of the nine UN peace operations created since 1999, all but one (the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea [UNMEE]) has enjoyed close relationships with non-UN actors.²⁹ UNMEE is a traditional peace-keeping operation composed primarily of the Standing High Readiness Brigade. Second, with the partial exception of Africa, UN peace operations remain absent from many of the world's most troubled areas, including Afghanistan, the Balkans, Chechnya, Colombia, Iraq, Palestine, Sri Lanka, and Sudan. These gaps have been partially filled by non-UN actors, as Table 2 demonstrates.

As Table 2 shows, in 2003–04 non-UN actors created eight new peace operations in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Pacific. This suggests that the proliferation of new peace operations will not necessarily increase the regional bias

27. Although it should be noted that the Australian-led mission in the Solomon Islands had host-state consent, the fact remains that the Australian government chose not to seek the approval of the Security Council. We are not implying that Australia was either morally or legally obliged to do so, just that it self-consciously chose not to.

28. See Alex J. Bellamy, *Kosovo and International Society* (London: Palgrave, 2002), p. 87.

29. The UN Mission in Kosovo enjoyed a close relationship with NATO; the UN's Mission in the DRC (MONUC) was temporarily bolstered by the French-led Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF); the UN's missions in Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, and Sierra Leone all enjoyed close links with ECOWAS; the UN's operation in Burundi (ONUB) replaced the AU's earlier mission; the UN's mission in East Timor (UNMISSET) was partly composed of the follow-on military component of the previous Australian-led coalition (INTERFET); and the UN's stabilization mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) followed the U.S.-led multinational force.

Table 1. United Nations Peace Operations (as of February 2005)

Operation	Date Created	Location	Approximate Authorized Size
UNTSO	1948	Middle East	160
UNMOGIP	1949	India-Pakistan	90
UNFICYP	1964	Cyprus	1,270
UNDOF	1974	Golan Heights	1,040
UNIFIL	1978	Lebanon	1,990
MINURSO	1991	Western Sahara	240
UNOMIG	1994	Georgia	500
UNMIK	1999	Kosovo	300 (civilians)
MONUC	1999	Democratic Republic of Congo	16,700
UNAMSIL	1999	Sierra Leone	17,500
UNMEE	2000	Ethiopia-Eritrea	4,200
UNMISSET	2002	East Timor	5,000
UNMIL	2003	Liberia	15,000
UNOCI	2004	Côte d'Ivoire	6,240
MINUSTAH	2004	Haiti	6,700
ONUB	2004	Burundi	5,650

NOTE: Abbreviations used: UNTSO (UN Truce Supervision Organization), UNMOGIP (UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan), UNFICYP (UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus), UNDOF (UN Disengagement Observer Force), UNIFIL (UN Interim Force in Lebanon), MINURSO (UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara), UNOMIG (UN Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo), UNMIK (UN Mission in Kosovo), MONUC (UN Organization Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo), UNAMSIL (UN Mission in Sierra Leone), UNMEE (UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea), UNMISSET (UN Mission in Support of East Timor), UNMIL (UN Mission in Liberia), UNOCI (UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire), MINUSTAH (UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti), and ONUB (UN Operation in Burundi).

evident in UN missions, but neither is it likely to reduce that bias.³⁰ Taken together with Table 1, three patterns are discernable. First, after a move from UN to non-UN peace operations between 1999 and 2003, that trend seems to have stalled in 2004. Although in 2003 there were six new non-UN operations and only one UN mission, that pattern was reversed in 2004 with three new UN missions and only one new non-UN operation. The pattern is clearer if the size of each mission is taken into consideration. In 2003–04, 23,590 new UN peace-

30. Michael Gilligan and Stephen John Stedman, "Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?" *International Studies Review*, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 2003), p. 49. Gilligan and Stedman argue that there is "evidence of regional bias in the UN's selection of missions, but the worst bias is against Asia, not Africa." The probable explanation for this bias can be found in the creation of relatively strong states in Asia and their insistence on an "ASEAN way" of noninterference.

Table 2. Non-United Nations Peace Operations, 2003–04

Operation ^a	Duration	Location	Authorizing Body ^c	Operational Command ^c	Approximate Size
Joint Control Commission	1992–present	Georgia/South Ossetia	Russia–Georgia–South Ossetia	Russia	1,500
Unnamed	1994–present	Georgia-Abkhazia	CIS	Russia	2,000
SFOR	1996–2004	Bosnia	UN	NATO	11,900
KFOR	1999–present	Kosovo	UN	NATO	20,000
Operation Palliser	2000–present	Sierra Leone	United Kingdom–Sierra Leone	United Kingdom	1,300
SAPSD ^b	2001–03	Burundi	South Africa–Burundi	South Africa	750
Allied Harmony	2002–03	Macedonia	NATO	NATO	470
ISAF	2002–present	Afghanistan	UN	NATO since 2003	5,500
Unnamed	2002–present	Central African Republic	CEMAC	CEMAC	380
Operation Licorne	2002–present	Côte d'Ivoire	France	France	4,000
Operation Concordia	2003	Macedonia	EU	EU	400
Operation Artemis	2003	Democratic Republic of Congo	UN	France	1,500
AMIB	2003–04	Burundi	AU	AU	3,250
ECOMIL	2003–04	Liberia	ECOWAS	ECOWAS	3,200
ECOMICI	2003–04	Côte d'Ivoire	UN-ECOWAS	ECOWAS	1,500
Helpem Fren	2003–present	Solomon Islands	Australia–Solomon Islands	Australia	3,000
AU Monitors and Protection Force	2004–present	Darfur, Sudan	AU	AU	3,000
EUFOR	2004–present	Bosnia	UN	EU	7,000

^aAbbreviations used: SFOR (Stabilization Force), KFOR (Kosovo Force), SAPSD (South African Protection Support Detachment), ISAF (International Security Assistance Force), AMIB (African Union Mission in Burundi), ECOMIL (Economic Community of West African States Mission in Liberia), ECOMICI (ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire), and EUFOR (European Union Force).

^bThe SAPSD was integrated into AMIB in May 2003.

^cAbbreviations used: CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), CEMAC (Economic and Monetary Union of Central African States), EU (European Union), AU (African Union), and ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States).

keeping troops were authorized, compared to 14,350 non-UN troops. Although it is too early to draw definitive conclusions from these figures, clearly the demand for UN peace operations remains. Second, these tables provide further evidence that the label “regionalization” does not accurately capture a more complex phenomenon involving various authorizing bodies and command structures. Third, states, coalitions, and organizations remain eager to legitimize their activities in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN charter. The missions listed in Table 2 either were authorized by the Security Council or had the consent of the host government and are therefore consistent with article 2 of the UN charter. This suggests a subtle change in the UN’s relationship with peace operations: from being the primary actor to providing collective legitimization for others while remaining a key actor in its own right.³¹

A Typology of Non-UN Peace Operations

How should these developments be understood and what impact have they had on international peace and security? Given that one of the central lessons learned during the 1990s was that peace operations required better coordination between different parts of the UN system, is the proliferation of actors likely to reduce the potential for success?³² It is helpful to start by distinguishing between different types of non-UN peace operations. In particular, we identify six broad categories of operation based on the actors conducting them (individual states, coalitions of the willing, and regional arrangements) and whether or not they received Security Council authorization.

INDIVIDUAL STATES

Peace operations conducted by individual states are rare, but they are not unheard of. Rather than acting alone, individual countries tend to play the role of pivotal states acting in tandem with others but nevertheless providing the intellectual and material impetus for a mission. It is possible to discern four types of individual/pivotal states that have conducted peace operations. The first are regional hegemony states that sometimes use peace operations to maintain

31. This role was foreseen by Inis Claude, “Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations,” *International Organization*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (July 1966), pp. 367–379.

32. See, for example, Ingvar Carlsson, Han Sung-Joo, and Rufus M. Kupolati, *Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda*, S/1999/1257, December 15, 1999, p. 42.

peace, security, and the status quo within their sphere of influence, and to protect their own regional interests. Such hegemony tends to operate under the auspices of regional instruments that they dominate—for instance, Russian operations under the auspices of the CIS in Georgia and Abkhazia, or the South African-led Operation Boles in Lesotho conducted under the umbrella of SADC. Second, former colonial powers occasionally conduct operations in their former colonies. In 2000, for instance, Britain sent troops to assist the beleaguered United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), and since late 2002 French soldiers have helped enforce a cease-fire and support an ECOWAS force during Côte d'Ivoire's ongoing civil war. Third, concerned neighbors may act as pivotal states when crises emerge near their borders. The Italian-led Operation Alba in Albania in 1997 would be one such example. Finally, great powers might undertake peace operations to maintain the international status quo. This was especially evident during the Cold War, when the great powers recognized particular spheres of influence and regularly deployed their forces to maintain order within them.

After the Cold War, individual states acting either as regional hegemony, former colonial powers, or concerned neighbors have become increasingly involved in peace operations, as have great powers. Unilateral operations remain rare, however, with British actions in Sierra Leone, French initiatives in Central African Republic and Côte d'Ivoire, and the South African Protection Support Detachment in Burundi being among the few examples. Most often, hegemonic states tend to act under the legitimizing auspices of a regional arrangement (as in the cases of Nigeria and Russia), and with the consent of the host government. Reporting on the British role in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe in the late 1970s, the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) concluded that actions coordinated or conducted by individual states could enhance the overall effectiveness of an operation and improve operational efficiency.³³ This was certainly true of the British and French operations in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire respectively. Conversely, however, individual states acting more in their own interests than of those they are ostensibly helping to protect can impede the UN's mediation efforts, prolong fighting, and cause further human misery.

33. Jeremy Ginifer, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe* (New York: UNIDIR, 1995), pp. 54–55.

COALITIONS OF THE WILLING

As noted above, states usually prefer to act in concert with others when undertaking peace operations. The difficulties that NATO experienced in trying to reach and implement a consensus on Kosovo, however, have prompted some states to make greater use of ad hoc coalitions rather than formal regional or global arrangements.³⁴ Coalitions of the willing are groups of actors that come together, often around a pivotal state, to launch a joint mission in response to particular crises. They may operate with or without formal authorization from a regional or other international organization. Since NATO's Kosovo campaign in 1999, coalitions of the willing have undertaken peace operations in Afghanistan, the DRC,³⁵ East Timor, Haiti, and the Solomon Islands. In these cases, pivotal states constructed coalitions to serve two primary functions: share the material costs of the operation (the primary goal in East Timor) and provide a degree of legitimization (the primary goal in Afghanistan and the Solomon Islands). The French-led Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) to the DRC was also part of an attempt to test the capacity of the EU's common security and defense policy. As with actions by individual states, coalition operations may or may not be authorized by the Security Council. Of the cases listed above, the UN International Force in East Timor, the ISAF in Afghanistan, and the IEMF in the DRC were authorized by the council. In contrast, the council recognized Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan as a legitimate act of self-defense. In the Solomon Islands case, although the Australian-led mission did not receive Security Council authorization, it did have the consent of the host government.

Coalitions provide the flexibility and operational efficiency of unilateral action but offer the potential for greater collective legitimization. Thus, to win legitimacy for its operation in the Solomon Islands, Australia created a coalition comprising Fiji, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu and obtained a declaration supporting the operation from the Pacific Islands Forum.³⁶ Although Australia provided the large majority of the re-

34. See Wesley Clark, *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Conflict* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2001).

35. Because the French-led IEMF in the DRC included contributions from non-EU states such as Brazil, Canada, and South Africa, we label this operation a "coalition of the willing."

36. The Pacific Island Forum is an organization comprising Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Island states designed to facilitate political and economic cooperation. Although the forum issued a statement supporting the mission, it does not have the legal or political mandate to authorize it.

sources and personnel, as well as virtually all the political and operational direction, it was able to resist the charge of neocolonialism because it was not acting unilaterally (see below). Coalitions, however, are not without their problems as alternative sites for the authorization and legitimization of peace operations: they are self-constituting, they may exert undue pressure to gain host-state consent, and they do not represent the will of international society to the same extent as the UN Security Council and General Assembly.

REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Since the end of the Cold War, regional arrangements have played a more pronounced role in peace operations. Before 1989 the Commonwealth, the OAS, and the Organization of African Unity were among the few organizations to conduct peace operations. Since then, a panoply of organizations including CEMAC, the CIS, ECOWAS, the EU, NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the SADC have done so. As noted above, the most appropriate relationship between regional arrangements and the UN remains controversial. In the 1990s many of these organizations conducted peace operations under their own authority, though only NATO has engaged in enforcement action without the explicit sanction of either the Security Council or the host government.³⁷ It is this latter, relatively rare type of operation that poses the most significant challenge to the UN system.

As with individual states and coalitions, the legitimacy and effectiveness of peace operations conducted by regional organizations is contested. On the one hand, advocates argue that they are more legitimate and accountable than unilateral operations; their permanent bureaucracies can provide helpful settings to coordinate responses to regional crises; and the regional norms they foster help utilize the benefits of unilateralism (e.g., rapidity, political commitment, and efficiency) while moderating its dangers.³⁸ Critics, however, argue that permanent regional organizations are encumbered with the same bureaucratic and decisionmaking problems that confront the UN; they do not necessarily confer legitimacy; and an undue focus on regional organizations encourages

37. Although in Liberia during the 1990s the ECOWAS Monitoring Group had the consent of the official government led by Amos Sawyer, in practice it proved impossible to avoid enforcement action against Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia forces, which controlled most of the country if not the executive mansion.

38. See Robert O. Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989); and Connie L. McNeely, *Constructing the Nation-State: International Organization and Prescriptive Action* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1995).

the idea that peoples should receive only the level of peace operations their own region can provide.³⁹

We identify six broad categories of non-UN peace operations (see Table 3). This information suggests that since the late 1990s, states have become more flexible about the types of actors they are prepared to work with and the means of legitimization. Nevertheless, the legitimacy of the UN's purposes and principles has not been fundamentally challenged. With few exceptions, actors continue to legitimize their peace operations by acquiring Security Council authorization or subsequent support, gaining the agreement of the host government, or in some cases both. Finally, although regional arrangements have assumed greater roles in relation to peace operations, there has been a shift away from supporting organized multilateralism toward ad hoc coalitions. Not only have some individual states (such as Australia and the United States) adopted this position, but clauses within the EU's draft constitutional treaty (July 2003) refer to the idea of "structured" cooperation based on "high military capability criteria" (article 3-208) and the implementation of certain European Security and Defense Policy related tasks by a "group" of willing and able member states (article 3-206).

Peace Operations: Legitimacy, Mandates, and Stable Peace

To assess the impact these non-UN peace operations have had on international peace and security, we analyze one contemporary example of each type of actor (identified above) operating without explicit Security Council authorization. In each case, we explore the operation's legitimacy, its success in accomplishing the mandate, and its impact on peace and security in the region. Before doing so, however, this framework requires some elaboration.

LEGITIMACY

The legitimacy of a peace operation is crucial for reasons related to its impact on international peace and security and the norms relating to the use of force, and the likelihood of successfully accomplishing its mandate. An operation deemed illegitimate by international society is less likely to enhance international peace and security because the outcomes of that operation will not receive international validation and because both the interveners and subjects of

39. For more details, see Michael Pugh, "The World Order Politics of Regionalization," in Pugh and Sidhu, *The United Nations and Regional Security*, pp. 31-46.

Table 3. Non-United Nations Peace Operations: A Typology with Examples

Actor	With UN Security Council Authorization ^a	Without UN Security Council Authorization ^a
Individual states		UK in Sierra Leone (2000–present) ^c France in CAR (1996–97) ^c Côte d'Ivoire (2002) ^c South Africa in Burundi (2001) ^c
Coalitions of the willing	UNITAF in Somalia (1992–93) ^b Operation Turquoise in Rwanda (1994) Operation Alba in Albania (1997) INTERFET in East Timor (1999) ISAF in Afghanistan (2002–present) IEMF in DRC (2003) MNF in Haiti (2004)	Helpem Fren in Solomon Islands (2003–present) ^c
Regional arrangements	NATO (KFOR) in Kosovo (1999–present) NATO in Afghanistan (2003–present) NATO in Bosnia (1996–2004) EU in Bosnia (2004–present)	ECOWAS in Côte d'Ivoire (2003–present) CIS in Tajikistan (1993–2003) ^c ECOWAS in Liberia (1990–97) ^c Sierra Leone (1997–2000) ^c Guinea-Bissau (1999) ^c Liberia (2003) ^c SADC in Lesotho (1998) CEMAC in CAR (2002–present) ^c DRC (1998) ^c NATO in Kosovo (1999) ^b Macedonia (2002–03) ^c EU in Macedonia (2003) ^c AU in Burundi (2003–04) ^c Sudan (2004–present) ^c

^aAbbreviations used: UNITAF (UN Task Force), INTERFET (International Force in East Timor), ISAF (International Security Assistance Force), IEMF (Interim Emergency Multinational Force), DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo), MNF (Multinational Force), NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), KFOR (Kosovo Force), EU (European Union), CAR (Central African Republic), ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), SADC (Southern African Development Community), CEMAC (Economic and Monetary Union of Central African States), and AU (African Union).

^bMissions conducted without host-government consent.

^cMissions subsequently welcomed by the UN Security Council in either a resolution or presidential statement.

the intervention are likely to incur material costs.⁴⁰ Similarly, within the war zone itself, an illegitimate operation is unlikely to win the support of the host population, making it exceptionally difficult for its personnel to complete their mandate and promote long-term peace and security.⁴¹ The domestic aspect of legitimacy plays an important role in shaping whether a mission accomplishes its mandate and establishes stable peace. As a result, the primary concern here is with the international elements of legitimacy.

There are at least three relevant approaches to understanding legitimacy and the process of legitimization in international relations. The first is a deontological approach, which holds that an act is legitimate if it conforms to moral rules. Realist and communitarian writers, however, may point out that within the international sphere there are few moral rules that are binding and common to all. Cosmopolitans could raise a further problem by suggesting that there are many cases where the moral responsibility to help others may demand actions that break the rules. One example is the moral dilemma raised earlier by Kofi Annan over whether or not to intervene to stop the Rwandan genocide without Security Council authorization. Moreover, deontological rules sometimes make contradictory demands on agents and cannot therefore act as the sole guide to the legitimacy of an action.

A second, or dialogic, approach to understanding legitimacy in international relations suggests that an act is legitimate if the decisionmaking process conforms to particular moral principles.⁴² Decisions may be considered legitimate if they are made on the basis of a genuine consensus (reached through exhaustive dialogue) among all the parties likely to be affected by the proposed course of action. Present conditions in world politics, however, are so alien to the ideal state considered in this approach that virtually every decision taken must be considered illegitimate. In addition, the dialogic approach creates the logical possibility that a decision that produces intuitively immoral consequences may nevertheless be legitimate.⁴³

40. Christian Reus-Smit has persuasively argued that states acting illegitimately incur more costs than those acting legitimately. See Reus-Smit, *American Power and World Order* (Cambridge: Polity, 2004).

41. James Gow and Christopher Dandeker, "Peace-Support Operations: The Problem of Legitimation," *World Today*, Vol. 51, Nos. 8/9 (August/September 1995), p. 171. See also Christopher Dandeker and James Gow, "The Future of Peace Support Operations: Strategic Peacekeeping and Success," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Spring 1997), pp. 327-347.

42. See Richard Shapcott, *Justice, Community, and Dialogue in International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); and Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community* (Cambridge: Polity, 1998).

43. For example, in 1978 there was virtual unanimity in international society that Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia and ousting of the Khmer Rouge was illegitimate. A purely dialogic under-

A third perspective, which is our preference, holds that an act is legitimate if its perpetrators justify it in terms of reference points (legal or moral) that are common to others and if those justifications are validated by other actors.⁴⁴ This approach rejects the deontological claim that rules matter in themselves and the dialogic insistence on the process of legitimization. Traditionally, states have been considered the most important voices in this dialogue, but the legitimacy of an action could be enhanced by support from nonstate actors within what the English School tradition refers to as “world society.”⁴⁵ In practice, there will be multiple and competing claims made through a common moral or legal language. For example, when actors decide whether to legitimize an act of humanitarian intervention, they must balance the competing claims of human rights and sovereignty, both of which are grounded in common morality and international law.⁴⁶ When states and other agents proffer justifications for their actions, others act as “juries” weighing the balance of the different claims.⁴⁷ The greater the number of voices within international and world society that validate the justification, the greater the level of legitimacy it should be accorded.⁴⁸ This approach, which focuses on justificatory reasoning, is based on two ideas: (1) states use a common language and set of reference points to justify their behavior to others,⁴⁹ and (2) states use these common reference

standing of legitimacy would be forced to insist that although not wholly illegitimate (because there were actors, however few, that supported the Vietnamese), the intervention was more illegitimate than legitimate. Given the barbarity of the Khmer Rouge regime, this is an intuitively problematic statement. For more details, see Wheeler, *Saving Strangers*, pp. 78–110.

44. From this perspective, legitimacy is a social fact built on consent that is meaningful only to the members of the community that accepts it. Ian Clark, “Legitimacy in a Global Order,” *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 29, No. S1 (December 2003), p. 80. For further elaboration of this conception of legitimacy, see Christian Reus-Smit, ed., *The Politics of International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

45. We follow Barry Buzan’s definition of “world society” as a domain composed of three types of actors (states, transnational actors, and individuals) where no single type is dominant over the other two. Buzan, *From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. xviii, 118–119. “International Society,” by contrast, comprises states.

46. The concept of a “common morality” is put forward by Terry Nardin, “Justice and Coercion,” in Alex J. Bellamy, ed., *International Society and Its Critics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 247–264.

47. Thomas Franck, *Recourse to Force: State Action against Threats and Armed Attacks* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 185.

48. This is the approach adopted by Nicholas J. Wheeler in “Liberal Interventionism versus International Law: Blair’s Wars against Kosovo and Iraq,” University of Wales, Aberystwyth, 2003, p. 5.

49. This point was first suggested in Friedrich V. Kratochwil, “How Do Norms Matter?” in Michael Byers, ed., *The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). We are grateful to Nicholas Wheeler for bringing this to our attention.

points (among other factors) to assess how legitimate they perceive a particular act to be and how they should respond to it. Actors that decide a particular action is legitimate are more likely to provide material and diplomatic support than those that do not.

To assess the degree to which a particular peace operation is considered legitimate, we first outline the justifications offered by the interveners, focusing on their claim to authority and the moral, legal, and political reasons they provide. It is then necessary to ascertain the response of other members of international and world society and ask whether the justifications were accepted and what impact the acceptance or nonacceptance of justifications had on the wider support for the operation. Although an operation's legitimacy is important, it alone does not determine whether international peace and security will be enhanced. Operations deemed illegitimate by international or world society, or both, can promote peace and security (such as Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia in 1978), while the 1990s is replete with cases of legitimate operations failing to produce such results. The second two elements of the framework therefore address the level of success of the peace operation itself.

MANDATES

How can the success of individual peace operations be assessed? What benchmarks can be used to ascertain whether one category of peace operations is more effective than another? Since the mid-1990s, analysts have proposed a variety of answers to these questions. Arguably one straightforward approach is to ask whether the mission fulfilled its mandate. This has the advantage of remaining sensitive to different varieties of peace operations. For instance, traditional peacekeeping aims to create conditions conducive to the conclusion of a political settlement by the parties to a conflict, whereas operations that manage transitions oversee sometimes extensive societal and political transformation.⁵⁰ It would be disingenuous to use the same benchmarks to evaluate different types of operations because they aim to accomplish different objectives in different political contexts. Evaluating a peace operation according to how well it accomplishes its mandate helps overcome this problem.

Using mandates alone to evaluate the success or failure of particular missions, however, is also problematic. Mandates are frequently vague and often

50. For more details, see Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping* (Cambridge: Polity, 2004), chaps. 5, 6.

leave significant scope for different interpretations of what the mandate calls for and whether or not it has been accomplished.⁵¹ In addition, non-UN peace operations acting outside the authority of the Security Council do not always clearly articulate a mandate. Instead, such missions are often justified in terms of vague political goals.

A second problem, raised by Paul Diehl, is that a focus on mandates, “ignores the common purposes peacekeeping operations share regardless of mandate” including the limitation of armed conflict and conflict resolution.⁵² This criticism, however, presupposes a higher degree of “common purpose” across peace operations than the historical record suggests. Advocates of traditional peacekeeping, arguably still the majority in the General Assembly,⁵³ would assert that the purpose of peace operations is neither the limitation of violence nor conflict resolution per se. Instead, it is merely the monitoring of cease-fires in order to create conditions conducive to conflict resolution.

A third problem with using mandates as the sole benchmark for evaluating an operation is that it may not reveal much about what was actually accomplished. A peace operation may be mandated to monitor a cease-fire yet could find itself in the midst of an unfolding genocide. Using the mandate as the basis for evaluating the mission, one could conclude that the peacekeepers successfully monitored the cease-fire until it broke down; their mandate was not to avert the genocide. Some analysts have attempted to get around this problem by suggesting the use of external criteria to evaluate peace operations. William Durch insists that successful missions should tackle the underlying causes of conflict⁵⁴; Steven Ratner calls for the long- and short-term impact on the target country to be the benchmark⁵⁵; A.B. Featherston’s reconceptualization of peacekeeping calls for conflict resolution to be at the heart of criteria for success⁵⁶; and R.C. Johansen maintains that a peacekeeping mission is successful only if it contributes to “world peace.”⁵⁷ The extent to which the man-

51. Paul F. Diehl, *International Peacekeeping* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), p. 33; and Trevor Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 351, 360–362.

52. Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, p. 33.

53. UN General Assembly, *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations*, A/56/863, March 11, 2002, par. 10.

54. Durch, “Keeping the Peace,” pp. 17–22.

55. Ratner, *The New UN Peacekeeping*, p. 7.

56. Featherston, *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping*.

57. Johansen, “UN Peacekeeping,” pp. 307–310.

date is accomplished should thus not be the only criterion used to assess a peace operation, but it ought to be one aspect of any evaluation.

How, then, should the mandate be incorporated into an evaluation of peace operations? First, it is important to assess the legitimacy and appropriateness of the mandate in the particular historical circumstances. This overlaps closely with the assessment of a mission's legitimacy and requires further examination of the justifications and debates that surrounded the creation of a particular operation. When the mandate was formulated, did actors point to deficiencies and likely problems? Was keeping down costs privileged over protecting the victims of violence? A second task is to interpret the mandate. There are likely to be many different interpretations, but three views are of particular importance: those of the Security Council or the appropriate constituting authority, principal troop contributors, and significant local actors.⁵⁸ Problems are most likely to arise when there are significant differences of interpretation between these three groups of actors. Focusing on the intersubjective understandings of the actors rather than on the written mandate helps to overcome potential problems caused by the fact that many non-UN actors do not set down formal mandates. Third, it is important to ascertain whether these three types of actors believe that the mandate has been accomplished. These three steps facilitate an assessment of whether or not the most relevant actors believe that the mandate has been accomplished. This is a crucial test, because if actors believe that non-UN peace operations are more effective than UN operations, this is likely to encourage a trend toward the former and away from the latter. Focusing exclusively on the mandate, however, may reveal little about the overall contribution of a particular operation to international peace and security. Therefore, the third element of our framework calls for an investigation into the long-term effects of the peace operation.

STABLE PEACE

Focusing on the legitimacy of an operation and its success in accomplishing its mandate does not directly reveal whether it contributed to stable peace within the war zone and beyond. It thus becomes necessary to take longer-term transformations into account. Featherston, for example, has argued that peacekeepers should be in the business of conflict transformation and that in the long term a peace operation should transform conflict-ridden societies by fostering

58. It should be noted that Security Council discussions with troop-contributing countries are not a matter of public record.

conflict resolution processes.⁵⁹ Similarly, Diehl argues that long-term strategic priorities should be given greater weight than the short-term tactical goals that dominate much of the analysis of peace operations.⁶⁰

There are, however, at least four major difficulties with trying to evaluate a peace operation's long-term impact on peace and security. First, as Johansen suggests, it is difficult to develop long-term criteria to evaluate missions.⁶¹ For example, expectations of what counts as "success" change over time. Second, identifying causal relationships over the long term is problematic. Citing the UN Mission to the Congo (1960–64) as a case in point, Daniel Druckman and Paul Stern argue that "a return to chaos after a long period of time does not make the earlier mission a failure."⁶² It is too simplistic to suggest that the failure of a prior mission is a direct cause of future violence. Third, focusing on the long-term impact of an operation postpones a verdict beyond a period that may be useful for practical purposes. Finally, in some cases the requirements of short-term and long-term peace may be contradictory. In territorial disputes, for instance, cantonment may provide the only means of securing an end to violence in the short term. Over the longer term, however, cantonment may lay the seeds for further violence and is likely to continue to exercise structural violence, as in present-day Bosnia and Cyprus, for instance.⁶³

Despite these difficulties, to understand the impact of non-UN peace operations on international peace and security, it is important to make judgments about such issues. Although expectations may change and there is often no clear causal link between a failed operation and future violence, it is possible to draw tentative, longer-term insights. First, it is reasonable to ascertain whether levels of violence in both the respective war zone and the wider region have increased or decreased over time. Taking a longer-term perspective that incorporates the period before the operation allows an empirical assessment of its impact. Of course, this method alone cannot establish whether the correlation between the operation and any reduction in violence is causal or

59. See, in particular, A.B. Featherston, "Putting the Peace Back into Peacekeeping: Theory Must Inform Practice," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 3–29; and A.B. Featherston, "Peacekeeping, Conflict Resolution, and Peacebuilding: A Reconsideration of Theoretical Frameworks," in Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham, eds., *Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution* (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 190–218.

60. Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, p. 33.

61. Johansen, "UN Peacekeeping," p. 309.

62. Druckman and Stern, "Perspectives on Evaluating Peacekeeping Missions," p. 3.

63. For contrasting views, see David Owen, *Balkan Odyssey: Experiencing the Struggle for Peace in Bosnia* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1995); and Radha Kumar, *Divide and Fall? Bosnia in the Annals of Partition* (London: Verso, 1997).

coincidental. To make this argument, an assessment of the operation's legitimacy and mandate is required. Second, because success and failure are subjective terms, the relevant intersubjective understandings of whether a particular mission was judged a success (at the local, regional, and global levels) need to be interpreted. Using intersubjective understandings rather than external criteria as the benchmark accommodates the problem of shifting expectations and contextualizes "success." This is crucial because it is actors' perceptions of success and the reasons for it, rather than the empirical fact of success (however defined), that shape preferences for different types of peace operations.

To evaluate whether the proliferation of non-UN peace operations has made a positive contribution to international peace and security, it is thus important to assess an operation's (1) legitimacy, (2) success in accomplishing the mandate, and (3) contribution to stable peace and security. Inquiring into an operation's legitimacy reveals important aspects about the relationship between the UN and alternative sites of political authority, the degree of consensus about how best to manage international society, and the likely problems that the operation will confront once deployed. Assessing the operation's success in accomplishing the mandate highlights the efficiency of different types of actors. Observing perceptions of the mission's contribution to peace and security draws attention to the wider implications of individual missions. In the next sections we use this framework to evaluate a contemporary example of each of the types of non-UN peace operations conducted without Security Council authorization.

Individual State: British Operations in Sierra Leone

In early May 2000, Britain deployed approximately 1,300 troops to Sierra Leone as part of Operation Palliser. Within six weeks the majority of these soldiers were withdrawn and a smaller contingent of approximately 200 left behind to train an accountable and effective Sierra Leone army that, in tandem with the UN operation UNAMSIL, would hopefully restore order to the country. In October the British government deployed another naval task force, known as the Amphibious Ready Group and the Headquarters of the 1st Mechanized Brigade (comprising approximately 650 personnel), to Sierra Leone to bolster the beleaguered UN force and signaled its commitment to deploy a further rapid reaction force of up to 5,000 troops if required.⁶⁴

64. "Military Assistance to Sierra Leone," Ministry of Defense press release 270/00, October 10, 2000.

The immediate catalyst, which provided the primary justification for the operation, was military intelligence from Britain's 15-man "technical assistance" team in Sierra Leone and what the *Guardian* newspaper described as a "panic-stricken report" from the UN claiming that the capital, Freetown, was once again poised to fall to rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) forces as it had in January 1999.⁶⁵ The underlying motives behind the operation, however, were mixed and more complex. They included protecting British citizens, averting a humanitarian crisis, defending democracy, supporting President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah (especially after the Arms-to-Africa affair⁶⁶), and supporting UNAMSIL and the future credibility of UN peacekeeping operations, particularly in Africa.⁶⁷

Initially the operation went smoothly with the troops securing Lungi airport and evacuating British citizens and others to whom Britain had consular responsibility. On May 17, however, British paratroopers and Nigerian troops killed four rebels about twenty miles from Lungi airport. This incident sparked a series of debates not only about the risk to British soldiers but also about the nature of their mandate in Sierra Leone.⁶⁸ The next serious incident concerned the capture of 11 British soldiers and a Sierra Leonean liaison officer by a group of rebels calling themselves the West Side Boys. After negotiations to release the captive troops collapsed, a rescue mission, Operation Barras, was launched on September 10. This succeeded in rescuing the hostages, although in the process, one British soldier and many rebels were killed.⁶⁹ Although there were calls, most notably from the Conservative Party, for British troops to withdraw following this incident, the British contingent was instead scaled down as the situation in and around Freetown stabilized. Operation Barras signaled that British troops could not be treated with the same degree of contempt as UN personnel and arguably represented the crucial turning point where the combined government, UN, and British forces gained the psychological upper hand over the rebels.

65. Ewan MacAskill and Richard Norton-Taylor, "Flawed Evidence Led to 'Mission Creep,'" *Guardian*, May 16, 2000.

66. In 1998 Tony Blair's government was embroiled in controversy over the so-called Arms-to-Africa affair in which the U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office was found to have colluded with the military consultancy firm Sandline International to bring thirty tons of arms and ammunition into Sierra Leone in contravention of a UN arms embargo that had been drafted by Britain.

67. See Paul D. Williams, "Fighting for Freetown: British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone," *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (December 2001), pp. 140–168.

68. See "Four Die in First Clash with British," *Guardian*, May 18, 2000.

69. For accounts of the hostage rescue mission, see Richard Connaughton, "Operation Barass," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Summer 2001), pp. 110–119; and Damien Lewis, *Operation Certain Death* (London: Century, 2004).

When evaluating the legitimacy of Britain's operation in Sierra Leone, on the negative side some groups within world society questioned its motives, suggesting it was driven by neocolonial desires to extract the country's diamonds.⁷⁰ There was also some skepticism about the British government's claims that it was fighting for UN credibility in Sierra Leone given that all but a few British troops operated outside UNAMSIL.⁷¹ Second, the Security Council did not explicitly authorize the British operation.

Most actors within international and world society, however, accepted Britain's activities as legitimate. First, as soon as it became clear that the Lomé accord (signed on July 7, 1999) had effectively collapsed, expectation within Sierra Leone, the Security Council, and the wider West African region turned to Britain to take a leading role in the international response. Given Britain's status as a former colonial power and the leader of the International Contact Group formed to help mediate an end to the war, such expectations were unsurprising.⁷² Second, given the concurrent debates about how the UN should deploy peacekeepers to the DRC, UNAMSIL's success was widely seen as being crucial for the future credibility of UN peace operations, especially in Africa. After ECOMOG's departure in early 2000, many members of the Security Council and political commentators were content to see British forces support UNAMSIL's activities even if they were not part of the UN force.⁷³ At the Security Council debate on May 11, 2000, for instance, the secretary-general, Argentina, France, Malaysia, Namibia, Portugal (speaking on behalf of the EU), Ukraine, and the United States all supported Britain's activities. No states explicitly criticized Britain's actions, although both Bangladesh and Malaysia argued that all international forces in Sierra Leone should be under UN command.⁷⁴ Third, by early 2000, both within the Security Council and beyond, the RUF was widely condemned for its brutal tactics (against civilians and UN personnel) and defined as the primary spoiler group within Sierra Leone.⁷⁵ As Foreign Secretary Robin Cook commented shortly after the arrival of British

70. See, for example, John Pilger, "Britain Is Recolonising Sierra Leone in an Attempt to Get Its Hands on the Country's Diamonds," *New Statesman*, September 18, 2000, p. 25.

71. On May 22, 2000, just fifteen British military observers were part of UNAMSIL.

72. See Tony Blair, "Britain's Role in Sierra Leone," press statement, May 19, 2000.

73. See, for example, S/PV.4139, May 11, 2000; S/PV.4054, October 22, 1999, p. 8; S/PV.4099, February 7, 2000, pp. 3–4; "A Line in the Sand," *Economist*, September 16, 2000, p. 25; and Hugo Young, "We Are Good At Getting In, Not So Good At Getting Out," *Guardian*, May 18, 2000.

74. S/PV.4139.

75. See, for example, *Sierra Leone*, briefing paper (London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, May 8, 2000); Jon Swain, "The Making of a Monster," *Sunday Times* (London), May 21, 2000; and Security Council resolution 1313 (August 4, 2000), which explicitly condemned the RUF as the major obstacle to peace and security.

troops in Freetown, "I don't see how we could maintain our self-respect if we turned away from this kind of savagery."⁷⁶ Any efforts that weakened the RUF as a military force were thus widely perceived as legitimate. Fourth, both President Kabbah and Secretary-General Annan had appealed to the British government, among others, for assistance.⁷⁷ The fact that charges of neo-colonialism were still leveled at Britain despite these important mitigating factors suggests that peace operations conducted by individual states are considered legitimate only in extraordinary circumstances.

Did the mission accomplish its mandate? An evaluation of the effectiveness of British operations provides a similarly positive assessment. Although lacking an explicit UN mandate, the British government publicly stated its objectives. These statements thus form the basis of our evaluation. Operation Palliser's initial objective was to help evacuate approximately 500 British citizens and others for whom Britain had consular responsibility. This was achieved by securing the area around Freetown, including Lungi airport. The mission was then broadened to include assisting the deployment of further UNAMSIL personnel. As Defense Secretary Geoff Hoon put it, Operation Palliser was designed first and foremost "to get British nationals out, and help get UN reinforcements in."⁷⁸ Both objectives were achieved with only minor instances of actual combat. Britain's broader political strategy had three elements: to train and equip the government of Sierra Leone with an effective and accountable army; to restore momentum to the peace process, specifically by supporting an expanded UNAMSIL and funding the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process; and to reduce the incentives that the illicit trade in diamonds had provided for the violence. Significant progress was made in all these areas: British citizens were quickly evacuated; UNAMSIL was expanded; the RUF was first contained and then, following Operation Barras, significantly weakened as a military force; in May 2001 UN sanctions were imposed on President Charles Taylor's regime in Liberia to prevent the illicit trade in Sierra Leone's diamonds; and the war was officially ended in January 2002. The major problem has been that building stable peace in Sierra Leone will be incredibly difficult without addressing the wider regional dimensions of the conflict. Apart from efforts to curb the trade in conflict dia-

76. Quoted in "Cook's Double Trouble," *Daily Telegraph*, May 15, 2000.

77. "Sierra Leone Cruelly Exposes UN's Crisis," *Guardian*, May 6, 2000. See also S/2000/13, January 11, 2000, par. 25.

78. Statement to the House of Commons, May 23, 2000. See also statement by the prime minister's office on Sierra Leone.

monds, British operations paid little attention to violence beyond Sierra Leone—stoked in significant part by Taylor's forces—which engulfed Liberia, Guinea, and Côte d'Ivoire.⁷⁹

With regard to the longer-term impact of Britain's operations, even before the war's end, Sierra Leone had become a laboratory for a variety of peacebuilding techniques. These included security sector reform (where Britain has been instrumental in training and equipping the new army and police force), judicial reform (including establishing a reconciliation commission and special court, largely under U.S. auspices), and the building of governance structures to ensure that people's basic needs are met. While generally welcomed by most observers, Britain's peacebuilding efforts have attracted criticism on several counts. First, questions have been raised about whether Sierra Leone really needs a professional army and whether overseeing two to three years of national service might produce better long-term results.⁸⁰ Second, doubts have been raised about the importance and amount of money being spent on the reconciliation commission and special court (which has relatively few potential suspects) rather than fulfilling the basic needs of the local population, especially those living outside Freetown.⁸¹ Third, Britain—unlike the United States—has been reluctant to speak out against President Kabbah's own poor record on human rights and corruption, with critics questioning his ability and desire to dismantle the patronage networks on which his own power rests.⁸²

Whatever the criticisms, the British government has drawn several lessons from its experiences in Sierra Leone. First, it considers Operation Palliser to be a successful application of the expeditionary form of power projection set out in its 1998 Strategic Defence Review.⁸³ This is particularly important because sometimes there may be no substitute for using military force against persistent spoilers. Second, the government acknowledged that building peace requires a long-term commitment of considerable (human and financial) resources.

What does the Sierra Leone case reveal about peace operations conducted

79. See Amos Sawyer, "Violent Conflicts and Governance Challenges in West Africa: The Case of the Mano River Basin Area," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (September 2004), pp. 437–463.

80. See the discussions in *Sierra Leone: One Year after Lomé*, Strategy Planning Series No. 5 (London: Center for Democracy and Development, September 15, 2000).

81. See Peter Penfold, "Will Justice Help Peace?" *World Today*, Vol. 58, No. 11 (November 2002), pp. 21–23.

82. We owe these insights to Michael Kargbo.

83. U.K. Ministry of Defence, *The Strategic Defence Review*, Cm. 3999 (London: 1998).

by individual states? First, such operations may be considered legitimate in certain circumstances. In this instance, the debate within international society over the operation's legitimacy focused on three questions: did the operation contravene the norm of nonintervention? Was the operation neocolonial in character? And was Britain abusing humanitarian arguments to justify the deployment of military forces to further its own interests, as happened so often during the colonial era? As this case demonstrates, even when conducted by an individual state, peace operations can be considered legitimate when they produce negative answers to all three questions. The operation did not break the nonintervention rule because both President Kabbah and Secretary-General Annan requested it. Although there were concerns about its neocolonial character, most members of international and world society rejected them because the operation directly supported an ongoing UN mission; it was relatively small in size and short in duration. Finally, although Britain's motives were mixed, most observers argued that the operation was not inspired by a desire to further Britain's political or commercial interests in the narrow sense of these terms. This suggests that peace operations by individual states can be tolerated and even widely supported in certain contexts.

As for the question of whether the operation accomplished its short-term mandate and encouraged regional peace and security in the longer term, the conclusion is more mixed. Initially, Operation Palliser did succeed in defending Freetown and averting the immediate humanitarian crisis. However, without the ongoing presence of UNAMSIL (which Britain was able to coordinate and direct), it is unlikely that the British operation would have had the impact that it did. The longer-term British commitment to building stable peace in Sierra Leone is also positive, but again it requires continued support from the UN and other international organizations. This suggests that although peace operations conducted by individual states may be particularly adept at responding to immediate crises, over the longer term the wider elements of peacebuilding require the resources, expertise, and commitment that few states could invest alone. In addition, had Britain tried to operate in isolation, the charge of neocolonialism would have undoubtedly been raised and could have undermined the operation's aims.

Coalition of the Willing: Regional Assistance in the Solomon Islands

In early June 2000, after a series of severe economic crises, the Solomon Islands government was overthrown in a coup that sparked a civil war between

the Guadalcanal and Malaitan people. The Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army had arrived on the scene in 1999, raping and murdering Malaitans and pillaging their settlements. The government was unable to halt the violence, and the Malaitans responded by forming their own militia, the Malaitan Eagle Force (MEF), which successfully raided police armories, seizing weapons and ammunition. As the violence escalated, 22,000 Malaitans were forced to flee Guadalcanal and had their property dispossessed. It was these events that prompted the MEF to overthrow the government and seize control of the islands.⁸⁴

Australia stepped in for the first time in October 2000 when it helped broker the hastily drafted Townsville agreement. Australia and New Zealand sent fewer than 20 peacekeepers to oversee the implementation of the agreement, and not surprisingly, it quickly unraveled. Police corruption remained endemic, and Prime Minister Allen Kemakeza used a compensation scheme involving \$25 million of loans from Taiwan to enrich his own family. The following year, Australia and New Zealand stepped in once again to pay the state's bills, including for electricity, the absence of which had left public offices suffering frequent blackouts.⁸⁵ Both states, however, refused to send police officers when requested by the government. As the Townsville agreement collapsed, the Solomon Islands plunged closer to anarchy.

The catalyst for Australia's decision to lead a coalition of the willing into the Solomon Islands was the release of a report in July 2003 by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI).⁸⁶ The report argued that the collapse of government in the Solomon Islands posed an important threat to Australian security because it would make the Solomons a potential haven for organized international criminals and, more worryingly, terrorists. A few days after the report was released, the Australian government announced that it planned to form the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) and repeated the security and humanitarian arguments put forward by ASPI. To help win support within the region, Australia proposed a multinational force, comprising elements from New Zealand as well as other Pacific Island states (Fiji,

84. Judith Bennett, "State, Society, and Governance in Melanesia," Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies working paper 2002/5 (Canberra: Australian National University, 2002), pp. 9–10. See also Gerard A. Finn and Terence A. Wesley-Smith, "Coups, Conflicts, and Crises: The New Pacific Way?" working paper (Honolulu, Hawaii: East-West Center, June 13, 2000).

85. Satish Chand, "Conflict to Crisis in the Solomon Islands," *ANU Pacific Economic Bulletin*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (May 2002), pp. 154–159.

86. Elsinia Wainwright, *The Solomon Islands: Our Failing Neighbor* (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2003).

Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu). In the end, a force of 2,200 was assembled, comprising 1,500 Australian soldiers, 300 soldiers from New Zealand and the Pacific islands, and 400 police officers.

The primary source of legitimacy for the peace operation was an agreement signed by the Solomon Islands and each of the interveners on July 24, 2003.⁸⁷ The agreement noted that the peace operation had been formally requested by the Solomon Islands government and had been endorsed by the Pacific Islands Forum, encompassing all the region's island states. It went on to precisely delineate the new force's mandate, chain of command, and rules of engagement. Both the agreement and RAMSI itself had the strong support of the overwhelming majority of Solomon Islanders. Interestingly, when the question of securing a UN mandate for the mission was raised (which, given the 2003 agreement, would probably have been a formality), the Australian government rejected the proposal out of hand. Its foreign minister, Alexander Downer, argued that the UN was an ineffective instrument and that a regional coalition of the willing had greater authority to authorize such a mission and would conduct the mission more effectively without the UN.⁸⁸

Despite the agreement with the Solomon Islands government, some states and commentators raised the question of whether Australia was acting as a neocolonial power in the region. Earlier that year, the Australian government had been accused of neocolonialism by Papua New Guinea when it proposed to add conditionality to its development aid.⁸⁹ Although in the Solomon Islands case Australia hoped to avoid this charge by building a regional coalition of the willing, it failed to escape completely. David Fickling, for example, argued that although the deployment of peacekeepers was not particularly troubling, the arrival of 100 bureaucrats to take over the administration of the Solomon Islands resembled neocolonialism.⁹⁰ Perhaps unsurprisingly, the

87. "Agreement between the Solomon Islands, Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, and Tonga Concerning the Operations and Status of the Police and Armed Forces and Other Personnel Deployed to the Solomon Islands to Assist in the Restoration of Law and Order and Security," Australian Treaty Series [2003] ATS 17, July 24, 2003.

88. "Alexander Downer Responds to Foreign Policy Criticism," *ABC The World Today*, June 27, 2003, <http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2003/s889845/htm>.

89. Satish Chand, "Deficit Bias, Debt Accumulation, and Repeat Economic Crises in Papua New Guinea," working paper (Canberra: Australian National University, June 2003). These concerns were partly produced by Papua New Guinea's previous experiences with Australian-led peacekeeping in Bougainville. See Jim Rolfe, "Peacekeeping the Pacific Way in Bougainville," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Summer 2001), pp. 38–55.

90. David Fickling, "The Bad Old Days of Colonialism," *Guardian*, July 21, 2003.

MEF leader, Manasseh Sogovare, also made this charge.⁹¹ On balance, however, the peace operation was widely perceived as legitimate precisely because it adhered to the UN's core principles inasmuch as the force had the host government's consent and because Australia took measures to mitigate the charge of neocolonialism by forging a coalition of the willing including New Zealand and the other Pacific island states.

Since its deployment, Operation Helpem Fren is widely perceived to have accomplished its mandate, at least the short-term objectives. The agreement between the interveners and the Solomon Islands government stated that the operation's immediate goal is to "assist in the provision of security and safety to persons and property" (article 2), while article 9 of the agreement permits the assistance mission to seize and destroy illegally held weapons.⁹² The agreement does not specifically define the mission's longer-term objectives. Immediately before the force was deployed, the various militias agreed to cease their violent activities. Concerns were raised about one militia leader in particular, Harold Keke, in Guadalcanal. But after protracted negotiations with the head of the mission, Australian diplomat Nick Warner, Keke agreed to a cease-fire and handed himself in to the authorities, who are investigating claims that he was responsible for several murders. Keke relinquished only after being persuaded that the international administrators and police officers would act with impartiality and would halt the corruption and partiality that were rife prior to Helpem Fren.⁹³ The question of general disarmament proved more problematic. RAMSI called for an amnesty on weapons in an attempt to persuade Solomon Islanders to hand in their arms. Although thousands of weapons were turned in, many thousands remained in circulation.⁹⁴ RAMSI did ensure, however, that weapons were not displayed in public, and it presided over a dramatic reduction in the illegal use of firearms. Helpem Fren has largely accomplished the security and law-and-order aspects of its mandate. The political and capacity-building elements require more time, but the coalition has pledged its long-term commitment to these programs.

What was the impact of RAMSI on stable peace in the region? Following on

91. Ibid.

92. "Agreement between the Solomon Islands, Australia, et al.," articles 2 and 9.

93. "Harold Keke's Surrender Met with Elation," *ABC AM*, August 14, 2003, <http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2003/s924093.htm>.

94. "Solomons Arms Amnesty Comes to a Close," *ABC Correspondents Report*, August 24, 2003, <http://www.abc.net.au/correspondents/content/2003/s930601.htm>.

from the aid conditionality dispute between Australia and Papua New Guinea, there was a real danger that the peace operation could further sour regional relations, damaging the cause of regional peace and security. That it has not is largely due to the size of the coalition, which includes every state in the region. As a result, the RAMSI experience has hinted at the creation of a new era of cooperation between Pacific states. In early 2004 the Australian government announced the creation of a new agency within the Australian Federal Police designed to police missions overseas. This is the first such agency specifically created for this purpose and may help to address, albeit in a small way initially, the policing problems that have dogged UN peace operations since the end of the Cold War.⁹⁵ By assembling a coalition, Australia also created an opportunity to foster lasting cooperation in the region. If such cooperation persists, and if it is successful in building state-capacity in the region, it could have a significant positive impact on regional peace and security. Moreover, RAMSI avoided both the potential legitimacy problems caused by unilateralism and the command and coordination problems associated with complex multinational operations. The coalition added legitimacy while the operation made use of Australian command and control, permitting a greater degree of operational cohesion than is usually present in multinational operations.⁹⁶

Operation Helpem Fren is also significant because its pivotal state, Australia, expressly rejected UN involvement on both normative and instrumental grounds. Nevertheless, the Security Council subsequently welcomed the peace operation, particularly the participation of the Pacific Islands Forum.⁹⁷ This was probably because the operation enjoyed host-state consent, thus allowing the council to overlook Australia's insistence that regional arrangements should take precedence over the UN. The successful implementation of the mandate suggests that pivotal states and coalitions of the willing make particularly effective peacekeepers because they can maintain a high level of operational coherence and direction. This insight must be tempered, however, by recalling that the Solomon Islands militias were smaller and more poorly equipped and funded than warring factions in many other parts of the world.

95. See Annika S. Hansen, *From Congo to Kosovo: Civilian Police in Peace Operations*, Adelphi Paper No. 343 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002).

96. David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, *Command Arrangements for Peace Operations* (Honolulu, Hawaii: University Press of the Pacific, 2002).

97. Specifically, the council "welcome[d] the leadership exerted by Australia and New Zealand, in close partnership with the other countries in the region in this regard." Statement by the President of the Security Council on the Solomon Islands, SC/7853, August 26, 2003.

There is thus no reason to believe that a UN operation or a regional organization would not have been similarly successful. What the coalition did facilitate, however, was a more rapid deployment than could have been organized by a formal institution lacking a standing or rapid deployment force.

Regional Arrangement: The African Union Mission in Burundi

In October 1993 Burundi experienced what the U.S. Committee for Refugees called a “slow-motion coup” in which Melchior Ndadaye, the elected president, as well as the next two officials in line to succeed to the presidency were killed.⁹⁸ The coup sparked sporadic waves of violence between the minority Tutsi and majority Hutu population that have claimed between 250,000 and 300,000 lives, mainly civilians.⁹⁹ A decade later, Burundi had 218,000 internally displaced persons, 753,000 refugees, and nearly 1 million people needing emergency food aid out of a population of approximately 7 million people.¹⁰⁰ Although the UN Security Council did deploy a small number of civilian observers, it refused to offer military assistance to the stricken country.¹⁰¹ Consequently, African initiatives have been the main source of external mediation, primarily the Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi, the personal mediation efforts of Presidents Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Nelson Mandela of South Africa, the South African Protection Support Detachment (SAPSD) from 2001 to the present, and the African Union’s Mission in Burundi (AMIB) from 2003 to 2004. To understand AMIB’s origins and progress, it is therefore necessary to understand how the SAPSD (which subsequently became AMIB’s advance detachment) arrived in Burundi two years earlier.

In November 1999 Nelson Mandela succeeded the late Julius Nyerere as the primary external mediator in Burundi’s conflict. Despite being accused of pro-Hutu bias and strong-arming President Pierre Buyoya into accepting his preferred terms, Mandela successfully helped negotiate the Arusha agreement on August 28, 2000. Six months later, Mandela announced a more concrete three-year peace process that involved power sharing between Tutsi and Hutu political parties. Several rebel groups, however, most notably Pierre Nkurunziza’s

98. See Alison Des Forges, “Burundi: Foiled Coup or Creeping Coup?” No. 93 (May 1994), pp. 205–208.

99. S/2003/1146, December 4, 2003, p. 10.

100. *Ibid.*, p. 11 and p. 9.

101. For details, see Ahmedou Ould-Abdullah, *Burundi on the Brink, 1993–1995: A UN Special Envoy Reflects on Preventive Diplomacy* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2000).

Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) and Agathon Rwasa's National Liberation Front (FNL), were not invited. Consequently, the peace process saw only a minimal reduction in the fighting.¹⁰²

In an attempt to get the peace process back on track, Mandela unilaterally called for South African troops to be deployed to Burundi as part of a Very Important Person (VIP) protection operation to help guard twenty-six Hutu politicians (mainly members of the Front for Democracy in Burundi) who had returned from exile and were anxious about the predominantly Tutsi army.¹⁰³ In October 2001, 30 South African policemen arrived as reconnaissance for a larger South African force. Initially, some locals were hostile toward these police, and they had to be protected by Burundian gendarmes. Shortly afterward, approximately 750 South African troops arrived in Burundi tasked with protecting the VIPs and training a local, multiethnic VIP protection force. The SAPSD was Mandela's personal initiative and did not have an explicit mandate to intervene in the civil war—the troops were to evacuate should the hostilities resume in earnest and they become targets.

Was the operation legitimate? Although the SAPSD was deployed without a UN Security Council mandate, several factors imbued the operation with a high degree of legitimacy.¹⁰⁴ First, with the occasional exception of Belgium and France, since the 1993 coup the Security Council had consistently signaled that no UN peacekeepers would be sent to Burundi. Mandela's (and Nyerere's) efforts were thus widely seen as helping the UN deflect criticism that it was ignoring Burundi's conflict. Second, the Security Council strongly endorsed the SAPSD only a few days after its deployment.¹⁰⁵ And third, the SAPSD was deployed at the request of Burundi's government.

The question of whether the mission accomplished its mandate is more problematic, however. Despite the South African presence, the security and

102. According to one respected analyst, Jan van Eck, far from "representing a genuine national consensus among Burundians," the Arusha process became "one of the major sources of dispute and contention." Van Eck, "We Can't Guarantee Their Safety," *Mail & Guardian* (Johannesburg), March 3, 2003.

103. The protection force was originally intended to be a multinational force with troops from Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa. The other contingents, however, did not arrive, claiming that the security situation remained too precarious.

104. The United Kingdom's representative explicitly reiterated that the SAPSD did not have a UN mandate in S/PV.4399, October 29, 2001, p. 2.

105. See, for example, Security Council resolution 1375, October 29, 2001; statements by the president of the Security Council and the Ugandan representative as chairman of the Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi, S/PV.4406, November 8, 2001, pp. 4–5; and statement on behalf of the Security Council by Mr. Knight (Jamaica), S/PV.4417, November 15, 2001, p. 2.

humanitarian situations in Burundi continued to worsen throughout 2002.¹⁰⁶ On December 2, 2002, however, another cease-fire agreement was signed in Arusha between Burundi's transitional government and the CNDD-FDD. This included provision for an African mission to monitor the cease-fire, supervise the cantonment of fighters, as well as ensure the two sides observed commitments to halt arms shipments, free political prisoners, and withdraw foreign troops. Speaking in the Security Council shortly after this latest agreement, South Africa's Deputy President, Jacob Zuma, suggested that the envisaged African force was a practical example of chapter 8 of the UN charter in action that would "act as a bridging instrument, opening the situation for the UN to come in when we have perfected the conditions."¹⁰⁷ Zuma's argument was later endorsed by the Security Council, which subsequently called for donors to help set up the African mission as soon as possible in liaison with the UN.¹⁰⁸

Following discussions with the UN about the mandate, financing, and logistics of the force, in February 2003, AU heads of state approved the union's first armed peace operation, and in April more than 900 South African troops were deployed as part of the AU Mission in Burundi for an initial period of one year.¹⁰⁹ As well as the tasks set out in the Arusha agreement, AMIB was also to support the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process. At the end of April, the AU appointed Mamadou Bah as head of AMIB, and on May 1, the SAPSD was integrated into AMIB, becoming its advance party. For several months, however, the South African troops were forced to operate without the Ethiopian and Mozambican contingents, which arrived in late September and mid-October respectively. Both states cited concerns about the fragility of Burundi's cease-fire and a lack of funds as reasons for their late arrival.¹¹⁰ By December 2003 AMIB's strength stood at 2,645 troops.¹¹¹

AMIB quickly faced military, political, and financial problems. In military

106. See S/2002/1259, November 18, 2002.

107. Quoted in S/PV.4655, December 4, 2002, p. 4.

108. See S/PV.4675, December 18, 2002, p. 3; and S/PRST/2002/40, December 18, 2002.

109. See "Communiqué of the Ninety-first Ordinary Session of the Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution at Ambassadorial Level," Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, April 2, 2003. AMIB was authorized to comprise some 3,500 troops from Ethiopia, Mozambique, and South Africa. The Arusha agreement envisaged its deployment by the end of December 2002, but logistical and political difficulties delayed its arrival.

110. Indeed, both contingents received crucial bilateral funding from the United Kingdom and the United States. Denmark, Germany, and Italy also made contributions to AMIB.

111. The force comprised 866 troops from Ethiopia, 228 from Mozambique, 1,508 from South

terms, it could not avoid being caught up in the civil war. Almost immediately after AMIB's arrival, Burundi's capital, Bujumbura, suffered heavy shelling in April and July from CNDD-FDD and Rwaswa's FNL troops respectively. And on June 30, AMIB troops killed four CNDD-FDD rebels while defending their cantonment zone in Muyange. Conversely, earlier that month South African troops stood by and watched CNDD-FDD militia kill one person and loot houses and shops in the town of Burumata, much to the anger of locals.¹¹² However, after AMIB's arrival, and especially after the signing of the two Pretoria Protocols,¹¹³ politically motivated violence did decrease—only to be replaced by violence of a more criminal nature—and the CNDD-FDD joined the peace process.¹¹⁴ AMIB also faced enormous difficulties in trying to disarm approximately 70,000 rebel fighters. Among other problems, several factions were reluctant to participate; AMIB lacked the resources to meet the basic needs of those combatants it did disarm; and as late as November 2003, AMIB lacked a finalized DDR plan (including a clear definition of a combatant).¹¹⁵

Politically, AMIB became caught up in international differences over how best to resolve the civil war. In particular, Deputy President Zuma publicly questioned the Tanzanian and Ugandan role in supplying weapons to various factions (especially the CNDD-FDD) and objected to these states' troops being deployed as part of AMIB.¹¹⁶ AMIB also faced serious financial difficulties. As Mamadou Bah pointed out in late 2003, of the \$120 million required to fund AMIB's operations for a year, only \$20 million had been made available.¹¹⁷

Did AMIB play a role in the establishment of stable peace in the area? On balance, by December 2003 it had contributed to a far more stable security situation in Burundi than existed upon its arrival.¹¹⁸ Indeed, Deputy President Zuma considered the situation stable enough to ask the UN to take over from

Africa, and 43 military observers from Benin, Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, and Tunisia. Ethiopia later indicated a willingness to expand its contingent to 1,300. See S/2003/1146, p. 7.

112. Liesl Louw, "On the Streets of Bunia and Burundi," *eAfrica*, July 2003, pp. 12–13.

113. The Pretoria Protocols were signed on October 8 and November 2, 2003, respectively. They set out commitments regarding political, defense, and security power-sharing. For details, see S 2003/1146, pp. 3–4.

114. S/2003/1146, p. 8.

115. See Human Rights Watch, *Everyday Victims: Civilians in Burundi's War* (New York: Vol. 15 No. 20(A), December 2003), pp. 9–15.

116. "Zuma's Other Hotspot: Two Rebel Factions Hold the SA-Backed Peace Process to Ransom," *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 44, No. 16 (2003), p. 6.

117. Quoted in "Burundi Peace Agreement," *Africa Research Bulletin*, Political, Social, and Cultural Series, Vol. 40, No. 11 (2003), p. 15532B.

118. For the dangerous security situation in 2002, see S/2002/1259, p. 6.

the AMIB as set out in the Arusha agreement and the AU's Addis Ababa communiqué creating the force.¹¹⁹ Initially, however, Secretary-General Annan suggested that the security situation remained precarious and that peace was unlikely to last without significant improvements in the living conditions of the local population. This was a worrying situation given that by December 2003, the UN's annual Consolidated Appeal for Burundi had received only \$21 million of the promised \$72 million of nonfood assistance.¹²⁰ Nevertheless, AMIB was able to stabilize the situation sufficiently for the new UN Operation in Burundi to assume its responsibilities in June 2004.

Despite some disagreements within the AU, AMIB was widely seen as a legitimate operation, although strictly speaking it conducted enforcement activities without UN Security Council authorization. Operationally, AMIB's key problems were its inability to make serious progress on DDR and deter all spoiler groups, which subsequently turned to criminal as opposed to political violence. More fundamentally perhaps, despite pledges of support from other African states, South Africa was the only state to commit troops from the deployment of the SAPSD in 2001 until late 2003. Nevertheless, under South Africa's leadership, AMIB acted as an important support mechanism for building confidence in the Arusha agreement and was able to respond flexibly to developments on the ground through the brokering of the two Pretoria Protocols. In the longer term, the difficulty will be building stable peace in Burundi despite the lack of funds.

Conclusion

Has the proliferation of non-UN peace operations enhanced international peace and security? Or has it encouraged a multitiered, regionalized system that threatens to undermine the UN's global mission? Our framework identifies three central factors to answer these questions: an operation's legitimacy, its ability to achieve its mandate, and its contribution to long-term peace and security in the target region. Of course, it is difficult to draw definitive judgments from three cases conducted by different actors and on an ad hoc basis. Nevertheless, some important trends can be discerned.

First, are non-UN peace operations legitimate, or do they constitute a funda-

119. S/2003/1146, p. 6.

120. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

mental challenge to the basic precepts of the post-1945 UN system? What is striking about all three cases, particularly when considered in light of earlier debates about the relationship between regional arrangements and the UN, is that although they were non-UN operations, with the exception of some statements by the Australian government, they were not anti-UN operations.¹²¹ None of the operations assessed here fundamentally challenged the core elements of the UN system, which permits the use of force with Security Council authorization, in self-defense, or when conducted at the invitation of the host government. Thus, although the UN was not the primary actor in any of the three cases, the UN charter's core norms were not violated. In Sierra Leone, UN peacekeepers proved a crucial element in the success of the British operation, while in Burundi the Security Council refused to deploy troops for more than a decade yet supported the SAPSD and AMIB. Only in the Solomon Islands case was the UN expressly denied involvement, but even here the operation enjoyed host-state consent and was subsequently welcomed by the Security Council. It could therefore be argued that by acting in accordance with the UN's norms, these non-UN peace operations have actually reinforced them. Nevertheless, the recurrence of the charge of neocolonialism was an important feature in two of the three cases (Sierra Leone and Solomon Islands). This indicates that Western states in particular will need to work hard to achieve international legitimacy for their peace operations, especially those that take place without explicit Security Council authorization.

Were these missions successful in achieving their mandates and promoting stable peace? In contrast to the U.S. experience in Somalia, a notable feature of Operation Palliser was its ability to operate in a "firefighting" and enforcement capacity alongside a preexisting UN mission. This was made easier by the idea that impartiality should be defined in terms of the UN's principles and the mission's mandate. Such cohabitation invariably raises problems of command and control, but despite a few hiccups in the Sierra Leone case, the relationship proved mutually reinforcing. The key difference between British operations in Sierra Leone and U.S. activities in Somalia was that the former were carefully limited in scale, scope, and time, and the objectives did not conflict with those of the UN mission. Similarly, in Burundi, the AMIB would not have been possible without the earlier SAPSD, South Africa's continued leadership, and Western funding for the other contingents. The result was the AU's first armed

121. We are grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers for suggesting this formulation.

peace operation. Finally, the Solomon Islands case suggests that an ad hoc coalition may help foster longer-term regional cooperation in security and governance. In addition, it suggests that non-UN actors can deploy more rapidly than the UN, particularly where one state is either operating unilaterally or playing a pivotal role in a coalition.

Although these cases are relative success stories (at least in the short term), it is important to sound a note of caution. In Sierra Leone, British operations could not have been so successful without the presence of a much larger UN force (UNAMSIL). For its part, Operation Helpem Fren confronted groups more closely resembling poorly organized criminal gangs than the types of warring factions confronted elsewhere by other peacekeepers. Although the UN may not have deployed as rapidly as the Australian-led coalition, there is no reason to believe that it could not have achieved a similarly positive result. Finally, AMIB troops confronted many familiar problems that UN peacekeepers had faced in the 1990s: many were inexperienced, underfunded, and poorly equipped, and all but the South African contingents arrived either very late or not at all. This suggests that the leadership and commitment offered by the pivotal state is fundamental to the overall effectiveness of the mission.

The potential danger raised by these non-UN missions is that poorer parts of the world could be denied access to high-quality peace operations by virtue of their geographic location and strategic insignificance to Western powers. Hence, in the longer term a consistent trend toward non-UN peace operations could undermine international peace and security. This conclusion is at least partly borne out by the Burundi case in which first South Africa and later the AU came forward out of necessity because the Security Council refused to countenance the deployment of a UN peace operation. Non-UN peace operations can therefore fill some of the gaps in the UN's uneven coverage. They should, however, be continually evaluated to ensure that they are helping to maintain international peace and security and not eroding the UN's commitment to assist all the world's regions, not just those that are strategically important to Western states.